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The uncertain (re)politicisation of fiscal relations in Europe: a 
shift in EMU’s modes of governance 
 
BARTHOLOMEW PAUDYN 
Abstract. Europe’s numerous fiscal crises – 2003 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) crisis, its subsequent 
2005 reforms, and the recent sovereign debt woes – draw attention to a shift in the management of EMU; 
namely the inclusion of more uncertainty-based governance. Understood as modalities of government, 
risk and uncertainty make the production of this fiscal-monetary space intelligible as a recognised form 
of knowledge and object of government. Whereas the Pact was devised as the anchor for EMU, it has 
come to symbolise its weakness. This article argues that the result is an antagonistic relationship between 
the programmatic and operational dimensions of fiscal governance, otherwise seen as a dialectic between 
the two competing domains of expertise/law and politics. Starting with the 2005 SGP reforms, and 
exacerbated by the credit crisis, uncertainty has been mobilised to justify alternative forms of managing 
fiscal conduct linked to new strategies of calculation and issues of responsibility. Bound to variegated 
notions of ‘normality’, I contend that the 2005 reforms signal the (re)politicisation of the budgetary 
framework and the reconfiguration of the politics of limits. Rather than marginalising informal 
judgement, the government through uncertainty places a greater emphasis on creative entrepreneurialism 
in fostering compliance in ways risk does not. 
 
Bartholomew Paudyn is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Political Science at the University 
of Victoria. His main areas of interest include government through risk and uncertainty in the context of 
the European political economy where he has recent publications. Currently, he is involved in a project 
that problematises the role of credit rating agencies in the European sovereign debt crisis and the politics 
of creditworthiness.    
 
 
Introduction 
The fiscal landscape of Europe is a fragmented collection of national policies interlaced via the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). In direct contrast to a centralised monetary domain, there is no equivalent 
supranational economic authority that oversees fiscal conduct. Defections result in Pareto-inferior 
equilibria, which are not overcome by the threat of sanctions. Both the November 2003 Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) crisis and current sovereign debt woes are indicative of this 
conundrum. Doomed to fail because of its overly rigid structure, the Pact was perceived as artificially 
uniform.
1
 Punitive measures were never seriously entertained; especially since, as Arestis and Sawyer 
remind us, most countries failed to meet the convergence criteria upon adopting the euro.
2
 False statistics 
were even submitted. All these factors amplified the politics of risk and uncertainty associated with fiscal 
management. To amend the negative externalities and ease the tensions produced by the Ecofin crisis, the 
architects of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – the Council with the Commission – introduced a 
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more flexible and discretionary regulatory framework in 2005. What did this shift represent? Arguably, 
this marked a transition to a greater reliance on uncertainty-centred modes of governance and signalled 
the (re)politicisation of budgetary governance and expertise in Europe. How uncertainty is appropriated 
and informs this managerial shift – which seek to reconcile this dualism between national fiscal 
sovereignty and EMU policy convergence – is at the core of this article.      
 In large part, this change in the rationality of fiscal governance is a reaction to the excessive 
deficit financing being adopted by virtually all Member States. Particularly troublesome for the euro area, 
as Heipertz and Verdun contend, it is a recognition that the European fiscal framework is a political 
protocol and not a legally binding contract which can be enforced through conventional legal means.
3
 
Tensions flare as new geographies of authority and notions of expertise form from the injection of 
competing political agendas into economic policy. Orchestrated through the deployment of a novel set of 
discourses and technologies of uncertainty, the movement in the reorganisation of this emerging fiscal-
monetary space is codified in the reformed Pact; as fragile as it is. New regulatory spaces are opening up 
that question risk’s dominance as a governmental construct as the problem of fiscal management is 
reframed along vectors of uncertainty. Similar to O’Malley, I argue that uncertainty government involves 
the mobilisation of the perception of contingency implicit in (fiscal) relations so as to connect strategies 
of government(ality) and law.
4
  
 As an invention of government, uncertainty is helping engineer a novel leverage of control, or an 
authoritative capacity, designed to modulate the fiscal conduct of Member States according to variegated 
notions of normality. Rather than subscribing to a single and static notion of normality, as was the case 
with the ‘close-to-balance or in surplus’ (CTBOIS) requirement, the new Pact reaffirms that the definition 
of a normal fiscal standard is contestable. EMU is the site of contestation where competing visions of 
normality are articulated. These considerations inform how states define their national interests. Although 
they may prove fragmentary, differentiated appraisals are necessary to accommodate this diversity and 
variability among Member States. Subsequently, this affects how responsibility is reconceptualised and 
legitimised in EMU. Whatever forms the Pact assumes the ambition is to induce the internalisation of 
self-regulation among Member States to respect the statutes.   
 My intention is to problematise European economic governance in light of its fiscal debacle and 
the March 2005 reforms it engendered. As economic programmes become increasingly susceptible to 
being (re)politicised according to the socio-economic goals legitimated by ‘Europe 2020’, the EU's 
growth strategy, what modes of governance are appropriated in this redefinition of fiscal politics? How 
does the differentiated assessment of SGP statutes problematise European fiscal management? Moreover, 
how does this affect the political economy of budgetary surveillance? I submit that budgetary profligacy 
has (re)politicised fiscal governance and amplified the antagonisms implicit in the organisation of EMU. 
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This reintroduces neo-Keynesian demand management strategies into an essentially monetarist creation.
5
 
Unfortunately, this is unsustainable for very long as budgets are ballooning. At the same time, the 
dominance of the conventional (neoliberal) risk-centred approach – censuring political involvement in the 
economy – is being disturbed. New forms of uncertainty government on the ‘preventative arm’, such as 
the medium-term budgetary objectives (MTO) and review (MTBR), are devised to accommodate the 
resulting tensions. The interesting observation, however, is not that there is more uncertainty or risk. 
Rather it is how uncertainty moderates the politics of representation associated with the problem of fiscal 
profligacy and how these perceptions are mobilised in the form of a new regulatory apparatus which 
seeks to control EMU subjects into compliance.  
 Explaining what ‘caused’ these crises is not the objective.6 Rather my intention is to reveal how 
the revised Pact signals a different way of framing the problem of governing fiscal relation in EMU by 
acting on the capacity of governments as free actors; namely in relation to their sovereignty through the 
construct of uncertainty. This shift alters the relationship between the programmatic and operational 
dimensions of fiscal governance – conceptualised as a dialectic between expertise/law and politics – to 
include new forms of control and subjectification. Expertise is changing as boundaries dissolve around 
previously immune forms of regulation grounded in risk and new stabilisations are (re)politicised 
according to goals legitimated by Europe 2020. Derived from variegated representations of normality, 
expertise adapts to mobilise reframed perceptions of responsibility in the effort to control the conduct of 
Member States. New compliance technologies, such as the MTBR, act on the contingency of Member 
States. Rather than imposing some artificially uniform criteria, this subjectification comprises a novel 
leverage that is exerted by the organisational fiscal apparatus, in the hope of normalising EMU subjects 
into compliance. Whether it is successful is dubious given deteriorating public balances in the wake of the 
2008 credit crisis. Nevertheless, techniques that promote national fiscal ownership are essential for the 
viability of EMU.   
 As a modality of government, uncertainty informs the creation of this authoritative capacity to act 
on states. Greater reliance is being placed on non-quantitative techniques, such as critical judgement and 
seasoned estimations, to calculate available prospects in the appraisal of fiscal conduct and in the 
execution of budgetary rules. Not only do aggregating methods akin to risk diminish in utility in unique 
situations where a probability distribution cannot be quantified to indicate and evaluate Member State 
performance but their credibility has been severely tarnished by the credit crisis for which, in part, they 
were responsible. Embedded in a new technological apparatus, this rearticulation is the strategic 
recodification of expertise/law and authority in EMU. As such, this is a discussion about challenging 
boundaries and the politics of limits. 
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  The following argument is developed in three stages. First, I revisit and develop the fiscal 
profligacy problematic. Here the recent history of budgetary conduct in EMU is presented in order to 
begin to understand how the underlying rationality of fiscal governance is changing to accommodate a 
growing diversity of demands. Next, the conceptual territory of risk and uncertainty, as modes of 
governance, is discussed in relation to governmentality. Third, I proceed to analyse how the Ecofin crisis 
triggered the transition to a reliance on uncertainty based forms of regulation. Diagnosing the MTBR of 
country-specific MTOs reveals how the relationship between expertise/law and politics is changing and 
what it means for the political economy of budgetary surveillance. By problematising the categories that 
conventional accounts fail to do, this article sheds light on how the EMU space is conditioned into 
existence through particular discursive practices deployed to manage uncertainty. 
  
Fiscal surveillance problematic 
The problem of fiscal profligacy and practices of responsibilisation have a contentious history. German, 
or Bundesbank, intentions to export and codify a model of strict fiscal austerity to the rest of Europe met 
with opposition at the 1996 Dublin Summit.
7
 Originally launched as the ‘The Stability Pact’ 
(Stabilitatspakt), German Finance Minister Theo Waigel stressed the necessity of buttressing the 
Maastricht convergence criteria by including automatic penalties targeting members who joined the 
eurozone but breached its fiscal rules. Such draconian measures were also designed to keep the highly 
inflationary, periphery ‘Club Med’ (i.e. Italy, Greece) countries out. Otherwise, it was believed that their 
fiscal profligacy would jeopardise the credibility of the common monetary policy. Sustained opposition 
from France and all but the Netherlands convinced Germany to relent and recognise the employment and 
‘growth’ dimensions of fiscal sovereignty. Once again, however, those fears are playing themselves out 
with the usual suspects (i.e. Greece, Portugal). 
 A looming threat to EMU is that governments are prone to deficit spending. The appeal of such 
action grows when governments are faced with recessionary pressures, as in the wake of the 2001 or 2008 
economic downturns. Episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal bias challenge the Pact as European governments 
increase expenditure or cut taxes as opposed to prudently saving in case of an economic shock. Such was 
the situation precipitating the November 2003 crisis as most countries strayed from adhering to the MTO 
of CTBOIS and joined camp of the ‘deficit sinners’. As Savage and Verdun suggest, a pro-cyclical policy 
rapidly came to be challenged as fiscally counterproductive and politically inoperative.
8
 This lack of 
fiscal flexibility was critiqued as acting as a ‘straitjacket’ and denounced by Romano Prodi in Le Monde 
(October 17, 2002) as a ‘stupid’ pro-cyclical policy for damaging the economic position of member states 
at a time when expansionary measures are justified. Conversely, as we are witnessing, such behaviour 
during ‘good times’ merely deteriorates the fiscal position of Member States. They incur higher debt 
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levels, which prevent them from operating within the parameters of the framework when the economic 
cycle turns again. Runaway budget deficits can transform ‘exceptional and temporary’ circumstances into 
severe long-term crises that can destabilise EMU. 
 National politics contributed to aborting the issuance of an ‘early warning’ to Germany and 
Portugal in 2001 and again to Germany in early 2002. With an election looming (October 2002), 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder was afraid of the disruptive potential that a ‘blue paper’ from Brussels 
would have on his campaign. According to Dyson, ‘severe domestic political problems’ with ‘Agenda 
2010’ only exacerbated the issue of compliance for Germany, compelling Schroder to lobby Ecofin to 
veto the Commission’s recommendation.9 Tensions finally culminated in the fall of 2003. Although an 
‘early warning mechanism’ (Article 99(4)) was issued by the Commission, it failed to be activated by the 
Ecofin Council and ultimately proved ineffective in stymieing the excessive deficits. Acknowledging that 
they were in violation, Ecofin nevertheless rejected deflationary Commission recommendations and 
sanction France and Germany. Together with Italy and Portugal, they orchestrated a blocking coalition – 
by virtue of a qualified majority vote – to hold the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) in abeyance in 
favour of soft targets and time limits. Begg and Schelkle echo a shared sentiment by declaring that this 
‘sounded the death knell for the unloved Stability and Growth Pact’.10  
 Given such political temperaments are common, the Ecofin crisis reveals that threats to the 
integrity of the SGP cannot be effectively mitigated by devising targets against which risk probabilities 
are assigned. To be effective, budgetary surveillance must be more amenable to diverse, national political 
developments in the enforcement of the rules. Lacking a uniform expected value, the vulnerability of 
risk’s dominance in defining and managing EMU subjects and practices is exposed. Risk techniques are 
often ill-suited to adequately manage fiscal relations. Heralded as a standardised and ‘objective’ system, 
the Pact is in fact a political ‘contract’ amongst countries to retain sovereignty over fiscal policy. Unlike a 
conventional contract, however, its politicised nature thwarts its enforcement by legal means. Hence, 
Heipertz and Verdun are correct to assert that the ‘essence of the pact is not a mechanism of “quasi-
automatic sanctions” but the institutionalisation of a political pledge to aim for low deficits’.11 First and 
foremost, the SGP is a political protocol and fiscal indiscipline is a political failure. Whereas the SGP was 
devised as the anchor for EMU it has come to symbolise its weakness. As such, uncertainty has been 
mobilised to justify alternative forms of managing fiscal conduct linked to new strategies of calculation 
and issues of responsibility.  
 
The discretionary response  
The Pact no longer diminishes the perception of hazard as originally intended. This points to the 
antagonistic relationship between the programmatic (expertise/law) and operational (politics) dimensions 
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of budgetary governance. To reduce the downside risks facing the fiscal framework and restore its 
shattered legitimacy, officials need to tackle the problem of reconciling the dualism of national fiscal 
sovereignty and policy convergence. One response to this new environment came in the form of a 
European Council agreement entitled ‘Improving the Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’. 
Five areas of improvement were identified by Ecofin and entrenched in the ‘political compromise’, which 
the European Council formally sanctioned in March 2005.
12
  
 Success depends on the strength of and adherence to clear rules that favour discipline-oriented 
budgets. Whereas the reference values were retained, an increased focus on debt sustainability – with a 
greater emphasis on current national developments – improves the economic logic of the Pact. In 
addition, the following recommendations are deemed necessary: 
1) enhance the economic rationale of the budgetary rules to improve their credibility and 
ownership; 
2) improve ‘ownership’ by national policy makers; 
3) use more effectively periods when economies are growing above trend for budgetary                   
consolidation in order to avoid pro-cyclical policies; 
4) take better account in Council recommendations of periods when economies are growing 
below trend; 
5) give sufficient attention in the surveillance of budgetary positions to debt and sustainability.13 
 
From these statements, one may extrapolate the individualising tone underscoring the mentality of reform. 
The uniform requirement of CTBOIS is replaced with new, differentiated MTOs. Fresh provisions are 
measured in cyclically adjusted terms. From the revamped MTBR to a comprehensive account of ‘other 
relevant factors’ in the decision to invoke the EDP, the mechanistic and probabilistically aggregating 
methods akin to risk located in the original Pact are less visible.  
 With a renewed emphasis on long-run sustainability, the budgetary surveillance capacity changed 
with the recognition of ‘differential treatment’ and the accommodation of ‘exceptional and temporary’ 
circumstances.
14
 In expanding the discretionary power of EU experts and officials, such as those located 
in the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) or the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), the 
(re)politicisation of fiscal relations becomes increasingly visible.
15
 Informal judgement, not just 
aggregating probabilities, becomes more paramount in appraising budgetary conduct and in the execution 
of the new fiscal framework. As a ‘crude fiscal coordination mechanism’, Crowley argues that the Pact 
leaves substantial room for political manipulation.
16
 Subjective estimations, which are susceptible to 
political bias, point to a government through uncertainty. This rearticulation of risk and uncertainty into 
the political imagination of EMU is reconfiguring the politics of limits where expertise/law and politics 
often overlap and blur.  
 On the one hand, the consensus is that pro-cyclicality must be deterred. On the other hand, there 
is a disjuncture between what sounds plausible in law and how it is actually practiced. With the 
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introduction of ‘exceptional’ and ‘other relevant factors’, it is possible to repeat the steps of the EDP if 
failure to comply may be attributed ‘to unexpected adverse economic events with a considerable impact 
on the budget’.17 Special circumstances, such as the financial and debt crises, have the potential of 
delaying adjustments into the third year subsequent to an occurrence. Frictions over this notion of 
exaggerated lags provoked the proposition of a ‘minimum fiscal effort’, which would see a consolidation 
of the structural balance by a minimum of 0.5 per cent of GDP. Rather than being obligatory on the 
‘corrective arm’, this became the objective for adjustment towards the differentiated MTOs. Yet this 
criterion may be ‘massaged’ if attempts are frustrated by adverse circumstances, leading Cafruny and 
Ryner to contend that such discretionary clauses will, in fact, invite arbitrary abuses and irresponsible 
interpretations.
18
 Ostensibly, the revisions seem to preclude any direct intrusion into the fiscal affairs of 
Member States in favour of vague, precautionary mechanisms. The political discourse of uncertainty is 
becoming more evident. Left unchecked, excessive and diverging budgetary balances can destabilise 
EMU.  
 Abuses have indeed exacerbated the dangers brought about by the dilution of the very regulatory 
mechanisms designed to dissuade profligate behaviour. Repeated fictitious data by the worst offender (i.e. 
Greece) together with dubious risk management strategies reveal how a combination of regulatory and 
market failures have acted as a catalyst for the reconfiguration of state involvement in the economy. With 
unaltered incentives for compliance, Winkler contends that the SGP has lost its ‘teeth’ to become an 
impotent tool for fiscal consolidation.
19
 Arestis and Sawyer echo this sentiment, positing that ‘the death of 
the SGP is probably a better description of...the revamped SGP in March 2005’.20 Rigid rules may have 
been supplanted by elastic assessments but at what cost? Less transparent and more complicated than the 
original framework, contestation and uncertainty abound as to whether the Pact can in fact garner the 
necessary political commitment upon which its success hinges. The credit crisis has only amplified the 
politics of uncertainty and unmanageable budgets cast doubt on the commitment to fiscal responsibility. 
Conversely, is harmonisation plausible given what the Ecofin crisis has revealed about fiscal sovereignty 
and the asymmetric application of the statutes?  
 As such, a primary deficiency associated with the original SGP remains. Compliance does not 
depend solely on a new fiscal framework. As Buti notes: 
if the problem is primarily one of adherence to the rules, the priority should be to ensure  
rigorous implementation of the existing rules rather than to change them. At the same time,  
it is widely recognized that simply attempting to apply the existing rules after the watershed  
of November 2003 is not a viable option. Re-establishing a sense of ownership of the fiscal 
rules by all parties would be the precondition for their effective enforcement. 
21
 
  
Indeed, a successful regulatory regime of any kind cannot neglect that national fiscal ownership rests on 
the internalisation of self-regulation by Member States. Convergence between national interests and EMU 
 8 
objectives demands forecasts, analyses and recommendations that are specifically tailored to each 
individual member state and their unique circumstances rather than vague and generic ones. Given that 
these relationships are highly politicised, the internalisation of self-regulation is fostered by the 
convergence of national preferences as the option of defection becomes less attractive. In short, for EMU 
policy to be successful, it needs to manage individual national contingencies through new compliance 
procedures that do not infringe excessively on national fiscal sovereignty. Far from assured, the 
government through uncertainty is a step in that direction.  
 Flexibility in defining ‘normal’ fiscal conduct is crucial to accommodating state interests and 
Community ambitions. Risk government lacks this capacity to target the variability and diversity of 
political decision-making. On the other hand, practices of uncertainty incorporate discretion with creative 
entrepreneurialism as they help refocus legal responsibility. Member states are envisioned as enterprising 
subjects entrusted with the duty of prudently managing their fiscal books. It reaffirms sovereignty without 
sanctioning a culture of distrust as it simultaneously ‘enables and opens up new possibilities for its 
subjects, and restrains these subjects as they are made subjects of a certain calculative and disciplinary 
regime’.22 National fiscal ownership may be enhanced as the government through uncertainty does not in 
inhibit the internalisation of self-regulation as much as a discourse of exogenous risk. Although the 
greater manoeuvrability which it grants Member States must be in accordance with an infrastructure of 
referentiality (i.e. normality) that accommodates their unique contingencies within the context of a 
broader EMU. Arguably, states are more amenable to accept responsibility for their fiscal policy if they 
can identify common linkages between what they, and the EU, consider normal budgetary conduct. The 
alternative (i.e. uniform rules) has proven a failure.   
 
A new analytical instrumentality: Trajectories of risk and uncertainty  
This article is making to sets of claims. One set refers to an emerging governmental phenomenon that is 
coming into being; namely this fiscal-monetary space called EMU. More than a national space, its 
construction is rendering certain pressures arising out of its organisation visible. These 
operational/political dynamics conflict with the SGP’s original programmatic/legal objectives. The 
second set of claims concerns how governance is changing to reflect these tensions and its effects on the 
political economy of budgetary surveillance. How is surveillance as regulation adopting to deal with the 
problem of fiscal profligacy? To answer this question, I submit that ‘governmentality’,23 as a new 
analytical instrumentality, directs our attention to the diverse set of discursive practices that help 
constitute conceptions of normality as anchors for fiscal relations in this new space. It is this rearticulation 
of what is considered normal budgetary conduct that helps to legitimise new forms of responsibility upon 
which surveillance is based. Uncertainty is a modality of government that informs this transition.
24 
Its 
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performative effect is the recodification of new forms of authority that strive to balance fiscal sovereignty 
and Community protocol.  
  This is not a ‘theory’ of governmentality concerned with the kind of grandiose proclamations 
about universal ontology or a single normative truth characteristic of much of the IR literature. Rather, 
governmentality is an empirically-based analysis of the various styles of government that populate the 
entire terrain of international politics; including EMU. As Marieke de Goede argues, without being 
impeded by all the false dichotomies and theory-based burdens afflicting traditional IR explanations, we 
are better equipped with the tools that allow us to come to terms with the very conditions necessary for 
the actualisation of all kinds of governed relations.
25
 It helps ascertain how truth claims are constituted by 
dissecting the very discourses, institutions and technologies employed in their actualisation. Thus, 
Foucault concludes, it renders ‘visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a 
historical constant...or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all’.26 
 As a set of analytical tools, it can be deployed to decipher the connection between the cognitive, 
moral and material political economy of EMU. Its interdisciplinary character resembles more of a 
methodological approach than a totalising theory burdened by such things as attribution bias, causality or 
the responsibility of establishing ontological equivalence. Through the deconstructive/reconstructive 
ethos of governmentality, I excavate the governmental terrain of budgetary politics to reveal how 
knowledge – as a susceptibility to vulnerable fiscal conduct and as a register of responsibility – is 
constituted and legitimated in the production of responsible EMU subjects. First, the ‘deconstructive’ 
thematic seeks to interrogate budgetary management in order to reveal how the issue of fiscal profligacy 
is problematised and affects the political economy of fiscal surveillance. Second is the ‘reconstructive’ 
thematic, which is concerned with evaluating how this regulatory space is being reassembled through 
specific practices of representation/truth production, such as the MTOs and the MTBR, which embody a 
performative element delimiting the constitution of EMU as an object of government. In this sense, as 
Miller and Rose contend, the notion of an unproblematic reality is questioned as deconstruction discloses 
expert and political complicity in the representational process.
27
 
 For O’Malley, risk and uncertainty are not to be treated as either real or unreal.28 This relationship 
is not one of mutual exclusion. Neither risk nor uncertainty is inherently more or less abundant in this 
post-2005 reconfiguration of the fiscal framework. To understand this process as merely denoting the 
exchange of one class of variables for another is to miss the more interesting governmental dimension to 
this problematic. After all, there is not a rigid binary opposition between these modes of governance. Risk 
is not in the process of being completely displaced in as much as it is constantly ‘assembled into complex 
configurations with other technologies, particularly – if not only – with uncertainty’.29 Although some 
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like Beck or Reddy may advocate otherwise,
 30
 the relationship between risk and uncertainty is 
contestable and heteromorphic.
31
  
 Whereas risk is defined as an aggregable and probabilistically quantifiable frequency of an 
undesirable event, uncertainty may be understood as a singular, subjective estimation; as the ‘fluid art of 
the possible’.32 Uncertainty implies that possible outcomes may be identified but cannot be assigned a 
probability distribution denoting the success of such decisions given their unique circumstances. Greater 
reliance is placed on non-quantitative techniques, such as seasoned judgement and rules of thumb, to 
calculate available prospects. From a governmental perspective, uncertainty is qualitatively different than 
risk. However, conventional IPE typically privileges a perceived binary opposition between (quantitative) 
risk and (qualitative) uncertainty. Fixated on ontological totalities, these accounts patrol the margins of 
indeterminacy in the attempt to translate uncertainties into risks. But as constructs, they are configured 
together in ‘lines of continuous variation that can never be homogenised into a linear process of change or 
transformation’.33 In such an unstructured environment like the EMU space – which fails to reproduce 
itself at regular intervals – a uniformly collectivised approach may be desirable but ultimately infeasible.  
 
Migration of risk  
To properly understand the recodification of expertise/law and politics through the mobilisation of 
uncertainty, we first need to know how calculative frames became adopted in Europe. As hinted above, 
risk is typically calculated in terms of probabilistic estimations. Statistically refined by economists, ‘risk 
is the measure of variance around an expected value’ and is considered a tangible phenomenon/force.34 
Once this degree of probability is determined, it is then transformed – as ‘objective knowledge’ – through 
technologies into a capacity to mitigate abnormalities. In his article, Kessler discusses these symptoms of 
predictive positivism.
35
 Although the government through risk informs EMU policy, it is not indigenous 
to this space. To appreciate the transition to modes of uncertainty, we first need to trace how risk has 
captured the imagination of EU policy-makers to help define the EMU regulatory response to the problem 
of fiscal profligacy. This knowledge will help us understand how calculative frames are used to configure 
spaces and orders of political and legal responsibility.  
 Against the backdrop of the extremely volatile financial markets of the 1980s and the fears 
triggered by the collapses of, among others, Barings, Matellgesellschaft, and Long-Term Capital 
Management the following decade, risk began to dominate the agenda of both private and public actors.
36
 
With a calculus of probabilities at their disposal, EMU officials came to understand fiscal profligacy as a 
problem rooted in the language, ideas and methods of commercial risk management (e.g. risk metrics). 
Increasingly, Walters and Haahr submit that risk began to displace other forms of understanding EMU 
governance – through the lens of national economic security or in terms of socio-economic classes.37 In 
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order to promote sustainable budgetary balances, a risk-based SGP depreciated the role of informal 
judgement and policy discretion. Surveillance rested on the Pact being transparent, consistent and equally 
administered in accordance with the quantitatively defendable process of risk. An arsenal of 
probabilistically predictive mechanisms was deployed to achieve these objectives.  
 Neither unique to EMU nor politics for that matter, the migration of risk from the corporate sector 
and the study of how it has informed the design of the fiscal regulation remains underdeveloped in IPE. 
Instead, risk has been accepted as a natural fixture of EMU governance. To dispel this misconception, this 
article analyses European public sector management according to three primary organisational elements 
of risk identified by Power.
38
 Having a sound sense of how risk penetrated EMU, we may then evaluate 
how its authority to shape spaces and conduct changed with the expansion of sovereign debt.  
 The first concerns the emergence of risk-based ‘internal control’ in redefining organisational 
governance. Initially of principal interest to the field of financial auditing, internal control systems have 
been expropriated as a governance mechanism not only to the entire corporation but to the ‘broader public 
space’, thus equating them as ‘co-extensive with risk management’.39 Early warning systems, such as 
those employed by Ecofin, under Article 99(4) of the TEU, externalise institutional control arrangements 
as they monitor for budgetary positions that ‘are not consistent with the broad guidelines or risk 
jeopardising the proper functioning of EMU’. To buttress its relative position in the Stage III surveillance 
process, DG EcFin underscores the significance of cyclical economics and econometric budgetary 
forecasting in the early warning alerts issued by Ecofin on the Commission’s recommendation.  
 Simultaneously embodying and constituting the objects of governance, internal controls ‘translate 
primary risks into systems risks’, thereby allowing EMU to standardise its approach to potential 
dangers.
40
 Codified in Council Regulation 1466/97 as part of the ‘preventative arm’, this procedure 
connects various regulatory bodies which would otherwise be fragmented. Order is established across 
multiple sites within EMU through the coordination of resources in the identification and monitoring of 
threats before they happen. Unfortunately, this logic proved fallacious in 2003, 2008 and 2010. 
 Next is ‘operational risk’, whose variable form makes providing a precise and incontestable 
definition problematic; something which is characteristic of risk in general. But perhaps a broad definition 
offered by the Basel Committee includes the risk of ‘loss arising from various types of human or technical 
error’ and ‘typically measures of internal performance, such as internal audit ratings, volume, turnover, 
error rates and income volatility, rather than external factors’.41 What is striking about this component of 
risk is that it is actually devoted to regulating through uncertainty more so than risk. As Kessler notes, 
positivist philosophy often misrepresents uncertainty as a risk.
42
 Just as there exists no sound measure 
indicating when the next a Jerome Kerviel (Société Générale, 2008) will surface to exploit a system, there 
is no probabilistic method to predict the kind of budgetary policy flip-flopping performed by the Schroder 
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government. The degree of exigency involved in fiscal politics exceeds the capacity of the 
economistic/utilitarian calculus of risk. 
 Initially stressing microeconomic supply-side reforms, Dyson explains how Schroder abandoned 
the ordo-liberal orthodoxy – to considerable opposition from the Bundesbank – in favour of employment 
and growth strategies.
43
 An informal agreement in 2002 prevented the issuance of an official ‘early 
warning’ before the election. Soon the ‘Alliance for Jobs’ was quickly scrapped and replaced by ‘Agenda 
2010’ (March 2003), targeting labour-market and welfare-state reforms. Thus, politicians, as rogue 
traders, do not lend themselves to being readily managed as a numerical probability. Herein lies the 
tension between the programmatic and operational dimensions of fiscal governance. Since operational 
risk is in fact a form of uncertainty, it is imprudent to problematise its management in terms of risk. As a 
misguided approach, the original Pact was an inadequate system that only aggravated the operational 
dangers facing itself. 
 Finally, the category of ‘reputational risk’ connects the question of legitimacy and power with 
organisational identity. Simultaneously, the ‘logic of consequences’ anchored in rational expectations 
confronts, and overlaps, a ‘logic of appropriateness’, which articulates norms of responsible behaviour. 
Together they produce the growing leverage of ‘reputational capital’ and the devolution of legitimate 
forms of power.
44
 Automatic sanctions, argued Waigel, would help foster compliance as Member States 
knew that penalties were virtually a definite consequence of fiscally profligacy. Such conditions would 
protect the integrity of the rules-based SGP from frivolous decisions, thereby enhancing its legitimacy. 
However, it was Germany who eventually reneged on its promises as it lobbied with France to hold the 
SGP in abeyance. Every threat of or actual violation damages the reputation of the Pact. But these 
temperamental behaviours are too idiosyncratic to be captured in a probability distribution.
45
 Thus, reform 
was necessary to address these exigencies and it came in the modality of uncertainty.   
 
Uncertainty as a boundary object 
Now that we understand how the government through risk gained traction in the context of EMU, I now 
turn to how the political economy of budgetary surveillance has transformed with the transition to 
uncertainty modes of rule. Keeping in mind that uncertainty is often misrepresented as a risk, I unpack the 
uncertainty approach through the deconstructive/reconstructive tools of governmentality to reveal its 
distinct conceptualisation and effects on the relationship between expertise/law and politics in EMU. 
Similar to risk, the logic of uncertainty has entered the discourse of many disciplines and has been 
appropriated in diverse ways. Uncertainty is a problematising activity which is aimed at addressing the 
problem of governing the variability and diversity implicit in fiscal relations according to various logics 
of authority and responsibility. To govern through uncertainty is to do so: 
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in non-quantitative ways, by reference to experienced judgment, shred guesswork, rules of 
thumb, analogies and so forth. By implication, uncertainty therefore is a way of governing  
futures that are imagined as singular, infrequently recurring or unique.
46
 
  
Here expertise/law must adapt to cope with the flexible (political) dimension of budgetary relations. A 
more accommodating politics of limits may reconcile the tensions between national fiscal sovereignty and 
policy convergence. Of course, excessive accommodation often leads to excessive deficits. 
 Developments in economic theory, and in particular marginal utility and optimal allocation 
equilibria modelling, reveal how uncertainty is mobilised to help reconfigure the EMU space and fiscal 
responsibility.
47
 Knight distinguished between risk and uncertainty in his analysis of profit in market 
economies. He took exception to the ‘practical omniscience’ of every actor in the market purported by 
economic orthodoxy.
48
 Uncertainty is the inescapable reality of entrepreneurialism. ‘Unique’ business 
decisions are subject to imperfect information about the future. This hinders one’s decision-making 
capacity as expected utility-maximisation is inapplicable in various stages of economic life where 
uncertainty prevails. Definite numerical probabilities cannot be assigned to outcomes because agents lack 
a clear notion of the possible consequences of their actions. Not knowing what causal relations maximise 
utility jeopardises rational actor modelling of a predictive Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Nevertheless, 
Knight believed that the: 
 ‘degree’ of certainty or of confidence felt in the conclusion after it is reached cannot  
 be ignored, for it is of the greatest practical significance. The action which follows upon  
 an opinion depends as much upon the amount of confidence in that  opinion as it does  
 upon the favourableness of the opinion itself.
49
 
 
Calculations do occur but in the form of informal judgements emphasising the success of the estimate 
more so than the actual outcome itself. Often these are reinforced by the ‘shared mental models’ that 
actors subscribe to, which are cognitive practices used to interpret uncertain environments and discern 
interests.
50
  
 Sympathetic to Knight’s approach, Keynes believed that uncertainty eliminates the numerical 
measure of incidence preventing the forecasting of such things as prices, war or future interest rates. He 
also echoed the sentiment that irrespective of the absence of calculable probability:  
the necessity for action and decision compels as...to overlook the awkward fact and behave 
exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of  
prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability,  
waiting to the summed.
51
  
 
This is in contrast to the conceptualisation of uncertainty as an unknown risk.
52
 For Beck, enhanced 
information or better computational systems subsequently transform uncertainty into risk, which makes it 
tractable to rational choice modelling. But Keynes argued that there is an epistemological dimension 
implicit in the qualitative comparison of propositions. Lacking the comparative normality from which to 
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assign a superior outcome, rational choice models are incapable of telling us what to do. In other words, 
uncertainty is not reducible to risk. This undermines conventional economic orthodoxy as it questions the 
integrity of its decision-making capacity.
53
 
 General equilibrium theory often informs liberal intergovernmentalist (IG) studies of EMU in the 
form of abstract game-theoretic modelling where the intention is to identify the optimal strategy of 
action.
54
 Presented as ‘scientific knowledge’, risk is said to provide an accurate range of referentiality 
according to which fiscal conduct may be empirically measured. ‘Win-sets’ represent the negotiating 
margin of manoeuvre available to state actors during a crisis. For intergovernmentalists, holding the EDP 
in abeyance against Germany and France simply reaffirms the progressive loss of credibility the Pact 
endured as larger states shunned its rules at their own discretion.
55
  
 Yet, this ‘desire to replicate the prescriptive and predictive success of the hard sciences and a 
belief in the infallibility of rationalist-empirical epistemology’ proves inadequate in situations of 
uncertainty.
56
 The selection of outcomes in accordance with the dictates of expected utility modelling is 
hampered. Should uncertainty only be a risk disguised by cognitive limitations, Blyth argues that: 
 how ideas inform agency in moments of uncertainty would be irrelevant...All ideas  
 would be correspondence theories with zero ambiguity, and courses of  action, interests,  
 and choices, would be clear. In sum, politics would be unnecessary; which given its  
 ubiquity suggests that there may be limits to viewing uncertainty as a problem of complexity.
57
  
 
The social dimensions of risk and uncertainty do not readily lend themselves to statistical aggregation and 
forecasts. 
 Conventional theories, such as economic equilibrium models or IG, do not problematise how 
interrelations define and condition an event; namely the link between governmental rationality and 
practice. They treat risk and uncertainty as self-evident, monolithic technologies and in the process 
reinforce a fictitious quantitative/qualitative dichotomy. Nor do they account for the construction of 
normality, which, as Hacking reminds us, ‘has become one of the most powerful ideological tools of the 
twentieth century’.58 These epistemological deficits detract from the explanatory value of mainstream 
accounts of EMU. To divorce the fiscal regime from political reason by resigning ourselves to a totalising 
vision of risk or uncertainty hampers our capacity to understand the changing nature of EMU governance. 
Simply attempting precise technocratic control of something as multifarious and fluid as socio-political 
conduct is virtually impossible. One cannot aggregate and probabilistically pre-empt all the available 
combinations that factor into the decision-making process. Rather than defining this lack of secure 
knowledge as a type of incalculable risk, another analytical – as well as governmental – category is 
necessary. Here is where the value-added of uncertainty is most apparent in the problematisation of 
European fiscal management. 
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 Whereas the Pact was designed with clear statutes privileging risk management and a (weak) 
punitive mentality, the operational dynamics of EMU thwart this programme by challenging the idea of a 
single notion of normality underpinning the legal and political definition of a responsible fiscal subject. 
Variegated constructions of normality are being tolerated and practiced – for the time being. Because of 
these unique contingencies, surveillance must monitor how individual state propensities towards fiscal 
profligacy affect broader EU standards. Increasingly, this depends more on discretion and creative 
foresight rather than probabilistic modelling to ascertain normality. As countries, such as Germany or 
Greece, receive differential treatment in what is supposed to be a common monetary union, the 
relationship between expertise/law and politics is reconfigured.  
 From this process, variegated prescriptions of responsibility are produced that the EU can use as a 
leverage to control the fiscal conduct of individual countries. Similar to Aalberts and Werner, I argue that 
the invention of sovereignty is reaffirmed by targeting it in the control of Member States.
59
 The objective 
is to foster an enhanced sense of fiscal ownership. Thus, the Pact is a device that acts upon Member States 
in the attempt to constitute them as specific economic objects of government susceptible to the 
programmatic ambitions it embodies. Through this subjectification process, authority is exerted intended 
to normalise EMU subjects into compliance by mobilising their unique uncertainties.  
 
Uncertainty as a new mode of governance in the SGP 
Medium-Term Budgetary Review 
Accelerated by the huge infusion of stimulus following the credit crisis, more than ever, ‘fiscal policy is 
at the centre of domestic democratic politics’.60 The Council is adamant that national institutions need to 
‘play a more prominent role in budgetary surveillance to strengthen national ownership, enhance 
enforcement through national public opinion and complement the economic and policy analysis at the EU 
level’.61 As the new Code of Conduct stipulates, the improvement and sustainability of public finances is 
predicated on effective peer support and peer pressure establishing transparent and credible monitoring 
procedures.
62
 ‘Europe 2020’ reinforces this message. Unless Member States demonstrate a clear and 
decisive political commitment to the proper maintenance of their own books, symmetrical and effective 
multilateral surveillance remains in doubt. To this end, a strategic dialogue, in the form of the medium-
term budgetary review, is scheduled to evaluate the updated Stability and Convergence Programmes 
(SCP) in order to ensure compliance with the statutes.     
Whatever faith remains in the disciplinary effect of rules has allowed them to be retained as the 
centrepiece of multilateral surveillance. Of course, now the architects of EMU recognise the 
precariousness of relying disproportionately on numerical guideposts for effective fiscal governance. If 
excessively rigid, rules are breached; if overly lax, they prove redundant. In themselves, fiscal rules are 
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not sufficient enough to either guarantee compliance or promote convergence. Only as stakeholders will 
governments assume greater responsibility for their budgetary conduct in a manner conducive to the 
broader goals of European integration. The MTBR is intended to help facilitate this process by engaging 
individual Member States in a serious political discussion about their latest and forthcoming budgets.  
The purpose of the MTBR is twofold: (1) to ensure a proper coordination of national fiscal 
policies in the euro area; and (2) to provide sufficient peer support and pressure for sound fiscal policies 
at the national level.
63
 By specifying how fiscal programmes will achieve balanced budgets in a 
sustainable manner, it is possible to minimise the mismatch between budgetary positions and cyclical 
conditions. In the long-term, the tension between fiscal stabilisation and debt sustainability can be 
recalibrated as convergent forces help regulate variable policies. Here the MTBR aligns itself with the 
proposal for a ‘European Semester’ to provide better ex-ante integrated fiscal policy coordination. 
Together, ‘the formulation of more timely country-specific recommendations would benefit all aspects of 
surveillance - fiscal, macro-financial and structural’.64 
To deliberate the merits of recent budgetary circumstances and to ensure the effective 
convergence of national fiscal policies, the MTBR is executed before the summer. Prevention is 
purportedly enhanced and uncertainty mitigated since this redesign is more complementary to national 
fiscal calendars. Assessable consultations at this juncture occur after the presentation of updated SCPs but 
prior to the next round of budgetary planning. At this early stage, the MTBR can shape the national 
debate before budgets are finalised. It can encourage domestic reforms leading to the update of national 
fiscal frameworks and the closer convergence of policy.
65
  
Concurrently, Member States are invited to submit any information on their policy intentions that 
they deem pertinent in order to foster a comprehensive discourse about fiscal programmes. In the past, the 
MTBR typically reflected the risk projections endorsed in the spring Commission forecasts, which 
adhered to a ‘no-policy-change’ mentality. To be incorporated, a fair degree of certitude about 
programmatic detail was necessary. Consequently, as Blyth contends, ‘static models of change...made the 
content of new institutions a determinate function of the problems faced by previous institutions’.66 
Characteristic of risk analysis, this approach fails to compensate for policy intentions which are merely 
being entertained but evade being assigned a statistical vector in regards to their probability. Contingency 
is being neglected. To ameliorate this omission, thus enriching the budgetary surveillance process, the 
Eurogroup now welcomes the incorporation of such speculative agendas. The Commission is entrusted 
with evaluating this information in the preparation of forthcoming MTBR discussions.
67
  
Improved communication and the mobilisation of uncertainty in these redesigned fora provide a 
better reference of normality in the management of the contingencies facing governments. Such a 
strategic dialogue ‘underlies the important role that national fiscal rules and institutions can play in the 
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attainment of sound budgetary positions and in the respect of the provisions of the Treaty’.68 National 
fiscal ownership may be heightened as closer collaboration improves the identification, assessment and 
execution of MTOs and the fiscal programmes in which they are embedded. Initiatives of this sort 
demand that governments exercise their creative entrepreneurial skills in negotiating the different 
challenges facing them. Through the MTBR, the Commission is in a position to assist. Better overall 
governance translates into more prosperous economic conditions as states become less susceptible to 
idiosyncratic shocks spilling over. Buoyed by favourable markets (i.e. ‘good times’) – when they return –
constraints on fiscal freedom become more tolerable as the Pact becomes more palatable.      
  The MTBR is a disaggregating technology which opens up national fiscal spaces to reconfigure 
legal and political responsibility in EMU. It ‘relativises identities by penetrating or dissolving boundaries 
around relatively closed systems’ and ‘creates trans-societal and post-territorial discursive spaces and 
networks of relations’.69 This challenges the traditional politics of limits between EU institutions and 
Member States and what are perceived as international/national boundaries. By penetrating the national 
fiscal landscape, the MTBR can influence the design of budgetary policy to a degree not previously 
visible. Subsequently, domestic and Community objectives may be perceived as congruous and their 
interests as interwoven.  
Intact, national fiscal sovereignty is nevertheless modulated by the mobilisation of uncertainty as 
a governmental technique. Uncertainty government exerts an ‘indirect, productive power’, or leverage, 
which reaffirms sovereign spaces, while simultaneously making governments more susceptible to the 
endogenous responsibility of managing their own contingency.
70
 This contrasts with risk-centred formulas 
of rule which are, arguably, more exogenous of agency given their preoccupation with supposedly 
objective and quantifiable knowledge.  
At the core of this reassessment is the problematisation of state competence in terms of the 
relationship between expertise/law and politics. Through these reformed discursive practices, a novel 
fiscal-monetary space is being constructed where politics and expertise/law overlap to create new orders 
of responsibility. Rather than binary opposites, legal notions of what is considered proper fiscal conduct 
are relocated in the political. Through the politics of representation, uncertainty government renders 
particular EMU stabilisations visible and therefore manageable according to variegated notions of 
normality. But these fiscal configurations are temporary and constantly undergoing transformation as they 
are confronted with domestic, regional and global forces of change. To judiciously regulate fiscal 
relations means to effectively manage contingencies which are unique to each national context. The 
current reforms are one step in that direction as they recognise the uncertainty underpinning economic 
surveillance. Growing sovereign debt woes will only demand additional practices of self-regulation.  
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Conclusion 
Europe’s fiscal framework is susceptible to the antagonistic relationship between the programmatic 
dimension of EMU governance and its operational politics. The original Pact framed and sought to 
mitigate potential externalities resulting from this tension primarily through the modality of risk. 
Assigning a probability distribution to an outcome was said to produce the optimal allocation which 
yields the highest utility. Measuring variance through risk calculations could transform the management 
of an indeterminate future into a quantifiable and defendable exercise. Unfortunately, risk is backward 
looking and relies on the past reproducing itself at regular interval. Persistent variability and unique 
situations, however, characteristic of fiscal relations, cannot be captured in this manner. They are better 
understood and operationalised through the rationality of uncertainty. The 2005 reforms codify this 
approach.  
 Through the diagnostic analytic of governmentality, I have problematised the conceptual and 
governmental categories of risk and uncertainty in relation to fiscal developments in EMU. Recent 
recessionary pressures, spurred by the global credit crisis, only amplify the resonance of the government 
through uncertainty.
71
 Greater room to manoeuvre in deciding what constitutes as normal fiscal conduct 
has proven indispensible in keeping EMU intact. By defining ‘exceptional’ circumstances as being 
normal within the context of particular states, while engaging in prudent reviews, the EU is in a better 
position to mitigate uncertainty by remedying what Beckert identifies as the ‘discrepancy between 
cognitive capacities and situational complexity’.72 It can modify how the fiscal experience is temporally 
framed to hopefully influence the pace of adjustment. Each national fiscal situation is imbued with its 
own particular historicity and contingencies that inform how amenable it is to various forms of 
multilateral surveillance. What constituents as the ‘tolerable’ costs of adjustment that Greece – or any 
future bailout – can endure, given the inevitable austerity measures, will need to include calculations of 
uncertainty as well as risk.   
 By dissecting how the representation of contingency is socially manufactured through deliberate 
– rather than determining – technologies of truth production, we ‘open up technical and depoliticized 
economic practices to political scrutiny’.73 Through the MTRB technique, the Commission can modulate 
its regulatory approach depending on the context and time, thus steering both national debate as well as 
broader euro area development. Expertise/law is once again in the process of being reabsorbed by 
heterogeneous political forces as it conforms to the management of fiscal relations. The review 
strengthens the levers of multilateral surveillance without infringing excessively on national fiscal 
sovereignty. The shared objective is the stability and prosperity of EMU. For it to materialise, however, it 
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must accommodate plural notions of normality. As this configuration of discursive practices disrupts the 
artificial uniformity of risk management, it grants authority to non-quantitative methods anchored in 
discretion and judgement, thereby redefining expertise within EMU. This provides for a more 
comprehensive understanding of fiscal governance. 
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